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1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Irish labour market since approxi-
mately 1980 with a particular focus on the central role of active labour market programmes
in public policy. Active labour market programmes (ALMP) is an umbrella term for all
measures aimed at increasing either the supply of or demand for labour. We will outline
the theoretical rationale for labour market programmes and discuss their implementation
and development in the Irish context. Specifically we will outline the levels of expen-
diture and throughput on labour market programmes and attempt to place Ireland in
a comparative international perspective. Briefly we will examine some of the attempts
which have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of labour market programmes in terms
of the employment and income outcomes of participants. We will pay particular atten-
tion to long-term unemployment which was such a key feature of the Irish labour market
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
2 Ireland’s Welfare State
Ireland is usually characterised as a liberal welfare state in the Esping-Andersen sense,
aligned with the United Kingdom and (at the end of the continuum) the United States,
providing a minimalist and means-tested safety net (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). In
many respects this is fair, but in certain respects Ireland deviates significantly from the
liberal model. One respect is the relative importance of ALMP – policies that focus
on improving the situation of the unemployed and lower-skilled workers by training and
subsidy. In both levels of expenditure and institutional commitment to ALMPs, Irish
practice has tended towards the higher end of the scale, average to above average in
OECD and EU contexts, and substantially higher than the UK.
A lively debate attempting to characterise Ireland as either “developmental state”
(along the lines of East Asian economies) or a “competition state” has arisen. Advocates
of the former see government as not just responsible for, but also managing and directing
development. On the other hand, Kirby and Murphy (2007) and others have characterised
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Table 1: Labour Force Trends
Year Labour
Force
Total Un-
employed
Unem-
ployment
Rate
Long-term
Unem-
ployment
Long-term
Unem-
ployment
Rate
Incidence
of
Long-term
Unem-
ployment
’000s ’000s % ’000s % %
1983 1321 183 14.0 69 37.9 5.3
1984 1321 204 15.6 97 47.4 7.3
1985 1331 220 16.7 146 66.3 11.0
1986 1331 226 17.1 149 66.2 11.2
1987 1336 225 17.0 153 68.0 11.4
1988 1328 215 16.4 146 68.0 11.0
1989 1308 197 15.2 137 69.4 10.4
1990 1332 172 13.0 122 70.5 9.1
1991 1354 198 14.7 129 64.8 9.5
1992 1372 207 15.2 117 56.6 8.5
1993 1403 220 15.8 123 56.0 8.8
1994 1432 211 14.8 129 61.0 9.0
1995 1459 177 12.2 103 58.2 7.1
1996 1507 179 11.9 102 56.8 6.7
1997 1539 159 10.4 87 54.6 5.6
1999 1688 97 5.7 46 48.1 2.8
2001 1782 65 3.7 22 33.1 1.2
2002 1838 77 4.2 23 29.5 1.2
2003 1873 82 4.4 29 35.7 1.6
2004 1919 84 4.4 29 34.4 1.5
2005 2018 86 4.3 29 33.8 1.4
2006 2114 93 4.4 31 33.7 1.5
2007 2202 100 4.5 30 30.0 1.4
Note: LTU missing in 1998 and 2000. Source: http://stats.oecd.org.
the Irish public policy strategies has pursuing competitiveness first and welfare second.
By this reasoning, unemployment is an artifact of competitiveness, not a ring-fenced issue
to be tackled separately or through more generous social policy. In the words of Boyle
(2005, p. 16), “contemporary Ireland is an exemplar of the competition state, where social
policy is subordinated to the needs of the economy.”
A contrasting view is taken by Nolan et al. (2000, p. 3) who cautions, “there was a
great deal more to Ireland’s success than the liberalisation of markets. The state has been
deeply implicated in the entire process, managing both economic development and the
welfare state.”
2.1 The Irish Unemployment Experience
Large-scale unemployment beset the Irish economy in the early 1980s. In the first half
of that decade unemployment more than doubled – rising from 7 to 17% in five years.
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Some 220,000 people were unemployed in 1985 and in receipt of social welfare payments.
Subsequent analysis has placed the blame for Ireland’s unemployment crisis directly at
the door of the government. In particular, high levels of personal taxation raised the
reservation wage of jobseekers where the reward for work was eroded through taxation.
High unemployment was far from a passing phenomenon, and levels of unemployment
twice the OECD average persisted until 1995. With an average of 15% of the labour
force out of work from the mid-eighties to mid-nineties, the corresponding problem of
long-term unemployment also worsened. Long-term unemployment (LTU) refers to a
cohort of the unemployed who have been out of work for one year or more. Rates of
long-term unemployment were already high in Ireland, with almost two-thirds of all those
unemployed in 1985 having been out of work for more than a year. Combined with an
increasing number of lay-offs as the macroeconomic context deteriorated, levels of LTU
peaked at 11% of the labour force by the mid to late 1980s (see Table 1).
By any measure, Ireland’s problem was significant. Not only were levels of unem-
ployment high, but outflows to new jobs were also low (so-called “exits” from unemploy-
ment). As people’s attachment to the labour force weakened after long periods out of
work, tackling LTU became a priority for government. While government may hope to
remedy unemployment though sound macroeconomic management and economic growth,
the profile of those long-term unemployed is often complicated by inertia. It was widely
recognised that the paralysis associated with long-term unemployment was complex, po-
tentially independent of improvements in the macroeconomy and unlikely to be resolved
by a tightening of the labour market alone. With this in mind, the expansion of ALMP,
and in particular subsidised employment, became a priority for public policy.
3 Measuring Unemployment
Perhaps surprisingly, the definition and measurement of unemployment is not entirely
undisputed. Arguably the most intuitive method is to take the cohort of people claiming
unemployment support through social welfare offices – known as the Live Register. The
Live Register has established itself as a “headline” measure of unemployment though its
short-coming are numerous. For instance, persons working a three-day week and lawfully
claiming unemployment support for the remaining two days are counted on the register.
Those engaged in home-duties or care for the elderly may appear on the register, while
conversely a person who is effectively unemployed may be excluded on the grounds of eligi-
bility/administrative requirements. It also includes those who because of their proximity
to retirement age are deemed to be unemployed, but who have long-since withdrawn from
active job-search.
An alternative measure of unemployment is based on information provided to the
Quarterly National Household Survey, conducted by the CSO. Here respondants are asked
for their Principal Economic Status (PES). Among the benefits of deriving unemployment
statistics from labour force surveys, are that survey methodologies are similar across coun-
tries and classifications remain relatively constant over time. This is a contrast to the Live
Register where eligibility criteria for social welfare benefits changes more frequently. Not
least, labour force surveys accurately capture people who consider themselves to be un-
employed – independent of their social welfare eligibility.
Finally, the so-called “ILO standard” from the International Labour Organisation adds
the additional caveat of being, “available for work and actively engaging in job search”.
By this definition discouraged workers who cease their job-search are no longer strictly
unemployed since they have voluntarily quit the labour market. Since the ILO standard
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is a subset of PES – imposing only a stricter definition of active job search – it is normal
for ILO unemployment to be lower than the level reported in labour force surveys.
4 Varieties of Unemployment
In the course of any person’s career they may spend a brief period engaged in job-search,
or find themselves “between jobs”. Assuming they don’t become discouraged and enter
long-term unemployment, economists describe them as frictionally unemployed. While
some level of frictional unemployment is inevitable as people move between jobs, a well
functioning labour market requires effective mechanisms to aid job-search and speed up the
matching process between employers and the unemployed. In Ireland, the state training
and employment agency, FA´S, is the key actor in the matching process.
Seasonal fluctuation in demand for goods and services is common in many industries:
tourism, ice-cream manufacturing and home heating oil distribution are some obvious
examples. The annual cycle of layoffs and re-hires generates seasonal unemployment.
Those working a three-day week (so called “short-time”) during off-season are a good
example of the seasonally unemployed.
Cyclical unemployment reflects changes in the macroeconomic business cycle. On the
upside of the cycle, unemployment falls inversely with job-creation as the economy expands
and firms hire additional labour. On the downside and during recession, a fall in orders
and rising inventories may give rise to negative net job creation and rising unemployment.
Inherent in the process of economic development is the transition from labour-intensive
manufacturing to high value-added services. While the majority of workers will reorientate
their skills over time, a minority enter longer-term structural unemployment. Here the
role of the public employment service in retraining these workers and matching them new
employment opportunities is critical for individual welfare and more broadly, economic
growth.
On the relationship between unemployment and the overall price level in an economy,
economists frequently refer to the unfortunately-named concept of “natural unemploy-
ment” or the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). The NAIRU is
the level of unemployment which would exist even if the economy was growing at its max-
imum potential – where all productive resources, including land, labour and capital were
being optimally employed. If the skills set of part of the labour force is rendered obsolete
owing to structural change, then the NAIRU will be above its natural level. Conversely,
attempts by government to reduce unemployment below this optimum would spark a cycle
of accelerating inflation.
4.1 The self-clearing market?
Classical theory predicts a self-clearing labour market where price (wages) adjust automat-
ically to changes in demand. Unemployment, therefore, is primarily due to a mistmatch
between the demand and supply of labour. If the unemployed were willing to return to
work for a lower wage, this would put downward pressure on wages thereby encourag-
ing firms to hire more workers. But wages are far from flexible. Collective bargaining
on the part of unions, social partnership pay agreements, statutory minimum wage and
even social welfare all conspire to prevent an unchecked fall in wages. What follows is an
undesirable, albeit inevitable, increase in unemployment during recession.
Demand for labour is a derived demand – derived from how employers structure their
production to meet the wants and demands of consumers. At the most basic level, com-
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panies will hire more workers if wages fall. But other factors also contribute to demand
for labour and among these are the extent of regulation in the labour market (for example
employment protection regulation and minimum wages, or even employment subsidies).
An early tenet of the work of two Swedish economists (see 5.1 below) was to eliminate
structural unemployment by reducing the reserve army a reference to Marx’s “reserve
army of the unemployed”. For Marx, capitalism maintains a pool of surplus labour to
remind employees of their good fortune and presumably to promote acquiescence. In the
classical view of the labour market, maintaining a surplus of labour places downward
pressure on wages by through competition for jobs.
5 Active Labour Market Programmes
5.1 Emergence
The notion of an active labour market policy came to fore in the 1970s as high infla-
tion beset many of the world’s industrial economies, including Ireland. Two Swedish
economists, Go¨sta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, had successfully brought inflation under
control in Sweden using a double-edged approach of labour retraining and solidaristic
wage bargaining. The former ensured a ready supply of skilled labour, while the lat-
ter forced inefficient and under-performing firms out of business. Rehn and Meidner’s
work influenced OECD thinking and was formalised as “manpower planning” by the late
1970s. Notably, Esping-Andersen (1985) classifies these measures as macroeconomic tools
to counter rising inflation – not as a response to widespread unemployment directly.
In essence, manpower planning aimed to ensure that firms had an adequate pool of
skilled labour to draw from, while also retraining the unemployed and returning them to
work. It followed that retraining would facilitate structural change and ultimately achieve
full employment.
Outside of Sweden, ALMP was embraced as a possible solution to high levels of un-
employment and coincided with the recognition of long-term unemployment as a distinct
policy problem. The shift from passively supporting the unemployed (i.e. through so-
cial welfare) to activation reflected an extension of the strongly interventionist Keynesian
paradigm of the time.
Webster (1997, p. 4) dutifully reminds us that, “as a remedy for idleness, labour
market programmes have a longer tradition than formal economic theory.” She dates
the emergence of “modern” unemployment to the transition from agrarian feudalism to
industrial capitalism; and points out that sixteenth-century workhouses sought to achieve
many of the same basic aims as modern labour market policy (training, employment and
a “moderated” wage) – albeit with more stick than carrot.
5.2 What defines an active labour market programme?
Active labour market policy is a heterogeneous mix of supply and demand-side policy. On
the supply side ALMP are responsible for training and retraining the unemployed, and
may assist in matching candidates to vacancies through the public employment service.
On the demand side, ALMP may involve employment subsidies to firms or even direct
employment creation.
The fundamental goal of all active labour market policy is to reduce the number of peo-
ple in open/passive unemployment. If training authorities respond quickly to changes in
the composition of the labour market and tailor programmes to meet employer needs, then
specific-skills training may address structural unemployment. Similarly, general training
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may bring into the labour force those who, for a variety of reasons, maintained only a
tangential connection to the formal education system. Without the intervention of adult
education, even in the form of general skills training, these people may be at risk of
entering long term unemployment.
The OECD (2000, p. 176) have set out seven distinct objectives of an active labour
market policy:
1. Job creation, either to reduce the number of registered unemployed in the short-
run or to generate jobs persisting beyond the period of intervention, such as jobs in
the social economy.
2. Job redistribution, to re-order for equity reasons the job-seekers’ ranks and to give
the long-term employed a chance to enter into jobs which would otherwise be offered
to others, and thereby maintain an attachment to the labour market for groups at
risk.
3. Skill and human capital acquisition, which may not lead to a job immediately
but enhances the employability and productivity of the unemployed, whose skills are
otherwise eroded by long spells of inactivity.
4. Attitudinal change, combating the discouragement and alienation of job seekers,
enhancing their motivation and willingness to work; but also encouraging employers
to recruit and overcome prejudices and stigmatisation.
5. Increase of earnings, either in the long- or short-run; combating poverty and
unemployment traps, particularly in low wage and low skill segments of the labour
market.
6. Increasing the potential labour supply, or reducing structural unemployment
without increasing wage push inflation.
7. Addressing wider social objectives, such as promoting health, combating crim-
inality and enhancing the social cohesiveness of communities.
6 Theoretical Underpinning of ALMP
Two main schools of thought exist regarding labour market programmes. The first school
believe a laissez-faire/unchecked market is characterised by myopia, uncertainty and im-
perfect information, and is incapable of producing efficient/equitable outcomes in the
absence of intervention. A cycle of poverty may arise if individuals or groups are allowed
to fall too far below socially acceptable standards. In the words of Webster (1997, p. 9),
“failure breeds failure.”
A second school – while acknowledging the desirability of a laissez-faire self-clearing
approach to labour market management – also accepts that for reasons of equity or social
justice, the achievement of a purely laissez-faire solution may not possible. Instead, inter-
ventions are justified where they reduce the disincentives to work or train. In this liberal
perspective, high taxes on labour, high replacement rates and a high minimum wage are
distortionary and act to disincentivise work.
The theoretical pedigree of active labour market policies has often been questioned,
as many advocates focus on policy objectives without advancing a sound case for market
failure, which would justify intervention. In fact ALMP has rarely made headway into
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mainstream macroeconomic debate. Demand-side macroeconomics tends to view the un-
employed as the tail-end of a homogeneous labour queue; while labour market programmes
may rearrange this queue, but they will not resolve the basic causes of unemployment
(Webster, 1997). Supply-side macroeconomists argue that government intervention itself
contributes to unemployment and should be avoided. Not withstanding this, ALMP has
received rigorous attention in the work of Layard et al. (1991) and Calmfors and Lang
(1995) among others.
6.1 Effect on Employment & Wages
Calmfors and Lang (1995) analyse the effect of ALMP on wage pressure and equilibrium
employment in a union wage-setting framework1. They investigate if ALMP (through
raising the search effectiveness of the unemployed) leads to more competition for jobs,
downward wage pressure and an increase in equilibrium unemployment. ALMP are often
regarded as a mechanism for reducing unemployment without the inflation risks of tra-
ditional demand policies (Layard et al., 1991; OECD, 1993). Calmfors and Lang (1995)
address the renewed interest in the search effectiveness of ALMP arising from debate on the
“discouraged-worker effect” and negative duration dependence2 among the unemployed.
In their rigorous model of labour market flows, Calmfors and Lang (1995, p. 607) fo-
cus on non-targeted labour market policies (with broad eligibility), targeted policies (with
eligibility related to unemployment duration) and programmes targeted on new entrants.
They conclude an expansion of programmes is likely to increase effective labour-force
participation with positive employment effects. But they caution that where the risk
associated with dropping out of the labour force are reduced (when layoffs become less
dangerous) there is a simultaneous effect tending to weaken incentives for wage restraint if
wage-setters are forward looking. They caution that loosely targeted programmes should
be less well compensated so as to avoid adverse wage-setting effects. Since a loosely tar-
geted programme not only aids (labour market) outsiders, but also improves the alternative
employment opportunities of insiders, wage-raising effects may dominate.
More specifically, targeting the long-term unemployed is more likely to reduce wage
pressure for two reasons. Firstly, the positive welfare effects for the unemployed are more
heavily discounted the later programme placements occur. This means a worker poten-
tially facing unemployment must discount more heavily benefits accruing from ALMP
participation since eligibility into those schemes will not be reached until a certain period
of unemployment duration has elapsed. Secondly, enabling the long-term unemployed
(outsiders) means more competition for newly laid-off insiders. Similarly, targeting new
entrants would reduce wage pressure since their only effect is to increase competition for
jobs. Calmfors and Lang (1995, p. 617) identify a policy dilemma, where ALMP can
increase regular employment only by reducing the expected future welfare of a laid-off
worker 3.
If ALMP does succeed in raising the search effectiveness of the unemployed, demand
for labour will be stimulated when hiring costs are reduced by a more efficient matching
system. The result tends to raise both wages and employment at the same time, which
we can illustrate with an inward shift of the Beveridge curve in Figure 1.
1See p.604 for underlying assumptions: firms are perfectly competitive in product market; labour is
organised by a firm-specific union with monopoly power to set wages; unions seek to maximise the the rent
from unionisation. p. 603 (Fig. 1) for a conceptual summary of labour market flows.
2Where re-employment rates for the unemployed tend to fall over time.
3Referred to as the “iron law of active labour market policy,” the effect of which is weakened when job
matching is factored-in to their model.
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Figure 1: Beveridge Curve
Source: de Koning (2001)
6.2 Effects on the Matching Process
A fundamental goal of any active labour market policy is to facilitate the process of job
matching. This is a term for the simultaneous process of job-search on the part of the
unemployed and recruitment on the part of employers. Employee “mismatch” would arise
if the pool of available labour are not sufficiently skilled to take up vacancies being offered
by firms. ALMP influence the matching process through a variety of mechanisms:
1. by adapting the qualifications of workers, allowing them move between different
sub-markets for labour;
2. by encouraging the unemployed to engage in more active searching; and
3. by acting as a signalling device to employers in the absence of regular work experi-
ence.
Effective placement services should have a positive impact on the matching process
since they reduce the number of job seekers associated with any given number of vacancies.
Calmfors (1994) notes that improvements in matching represent a reduction in the cost
of hiring and lead to increasing demand for labour. In addition, he believes that to the
extent improved matching efficiency (reduced lead-time to employment) and higher relative
wages are substitutes for each other; firms will be less likely to attract labour by pushing
up wages. In this scenario improved matching may increase overall levels of employment.
Importantly, since search-intensity maybe reduced during participation in ALMP, any
robust estimate of matching efficiency must address both “locking-in” and treatment ef-
fects simultaneously. Simple comparisons of participants’ re-employment chances relative
to non-participants in open unemployment will be flawed, if they fail to take into account
the ex ante selection bias arising from individual search behaviour and employment history
(see Section 9 on evaluation).
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Table 2: Typology of ALMP
Market Orientation
Labour Market Leverage Weak Strong
Supply General Training Specific Skills Training
Demand Direct Employment Schemes Employment Subsidies
7 Policy Response: ALMP in Ireland
O’Connell and McGinnity (1997) characterise Irish labour market policy during the 1960s
and 1970s as mainly confined to the organisation of apprenticeship training and to match-
ing supply and demand for labour. These policies were in line with the OECD’s “man-
power policy” aimed at achieving full employment and strong growth. However, with
the onset of high unemployment and low growth in the 1970s, governments embraced the
Swedish example by adopting a variety of active labour policies. These included employ-
ment subsidies, training schemes and temporary public job creation schemes. From 1975,
the Youth Training Programme, Premium Employment Programme and Employment In-
centive Schemes were all introduced. In 1976, the Environment Improvement Scheme,
Temporary Grant Scheme for Youth Employment (Teamwork) and Community Work-
shops, all targeted the phenomenon of youth unemployment. According to O’Connell
and McGinnity (1997), by the 1980s, active labour policies had taken centre-stage in the
government’s response to mass unemployment.
However, at that time it was a commonly held view that unemployment was a tran-
sitory phenomenon. Emphasis was placed on demand-side measures to generate new
employment places, while retraining schemes frequently focused on finding employment
for the (relatively) most employable candidates – to the neglect of the most disadvantaged.
7.1 Flavours of ALMP
ALMP’s target constituency is diverse. Skills-specific training and apprenticeships may
help those who received a formal school education and who now wish to specialise; whereas
general training provides basic workplace skills to those who have been out of the labour
force for some time, or those who did not benefit from formal schooling to certificate
level. Finally, direct employment schemes and employment subsidies, may redress skills
and human capital depreciation incurred during a longer term absence from the labour
market.
O’Connell and McGinnity (1997) offer the following general typology of ALMPs based
on the conventional classification of schemes and programmes (see Table 2):
General Training: Programmes in this category provide basic/foundational skills and
are designed for those with poor educational qualifications. It includes programmes
for second chance education, for women returning to work after child rearing, for
long-term unemployed males, for young school-leavers, for people with disabilities
and may also offer training to develop community resources. Unlike vocational
training which enhances employability by teaching specific skills, general training
teaches general subjects often covered during second level schooling.
Skills Specific Training: The courses are designed to meet specific skills needs in the
economy and are usually targeted at specific industries and occupations. The FA´S
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Table 3: Indicative Table of ALMP Participation, 1983–2002
Year Training Employment Direct Total
% Subsidies % Employment %
1983 29,958 65.2 11,000 23.9 5,000 10.9 45,958
1990 37,686 66.0 4,792 8.4 14,598 25.6 57,076
1992 30,600 58.8 3,831 7.4 17,642 33.9 52,073
1993 29,065 51.5 9,532 16.9 17,822 31.6 56,419
1994 33,682 38.2 17,420 19.8 37,038 42.0 88,140
1997 28,850 26.0 26,115 23.5 56,090 50.5 111,055
1998 14,238 14.9 41,859 43.8 39,520 41.3 95,617
1999 15,789 17.2 39,581 43.0 36,579 39.8 91,949
2000 15,510 18.1 36,686 42.8 33,549 39.1 85,745
2001 17,693 21.5 33,807 41.1 30,692 37.3 82,192
2002 17,533 22.4 32,862 42.1 27,718 35.5 78,113
Mean 20,471 22.6 32,619 36.6 37,312 40.8 90,402
Note: Direct Employment = Community Employment (Social Employment pre 1995),
Teamwork (pre 1997), Part-time Job Opportunities Programme (pre 1997).
Sources: O’Connell and McGinnity (1997), Indecon (2002), ILO Laborsta Database.
apprenticeship programme is a good example of specific skills training.
Direct Employment Schemes: These programmes consist of subsidised temporary em-
ployment in the public or voluntary sectors – which O’Connell and McGinnity (1997,
p.20) term a “variant of conventional public works programmes.” While direct em-
ployment schemes may indeed lead to the provision of public goods/services, their
over-riding purpose is that of employment generation. In Ireland, Community Em-
ployment (CE) is the largest direct employment scheme. CE, which replaced the
Social Employment Scheme in 1994, is targeted at the long-term unemployed.
Employment Subsidies: These are subsidies to the recruitment or self-employment of
unemployed workers in the private sector. They may be paid to either employer or
employee and are designed to, “offset the relative unattractiveness,” of a long-term
unemployed candidate (O’Connell and McGinnity, 1997, p.21). The subsidy may
be seen as compensation for the greater costs of recruiting and training the long-
term unemployed. The subsidy comprises a lump-sum payable on recruitment, and
continuing payment and/or exemptions from social insurance contributions. The
Back to Work Allowance, launched in 1993, is paid directly to employees. Among
those paid to employers are the Employment Incentive Scheme (1977-1994) and the
Employment Subsidy Scheme (1992-1993).
8 Expenditure & Throughput
The pattern of expansion in ALMP participation from 1983 to 1997 reflected a deterio-
ration of the Irish macroeconomy and a seemingly intractable rise in both the numbers
unemployed and the incidence of long-term unemployment (see Table 3). In 1983 overall
participation stood at almost 46,000 – comprising 65% training, 24% employment subsi-
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Table 4: Scale of ALMP Participation, 1983–2002
Year ALMP as a percentage
of Labour Force of Unemployment
1983 3.5 25.1
1990 4.3 33.1
1992 3.8 25.2
1993 4.0 25.6
1994 6.2 41.8
1997 7.2 69.8
1998 5.9 75.6
1999 5.5 94.9
2000 4.9 115.1
2001 4.6 126.3
2002 4.2 101.4
Mean 5.5 89.3
Sources: O’Connell and McGinnity (1997), Indecon (2002), ILO Laborsta Database.
dies and 11% direct employment. Within seven years, overall numbers rose some 11,000,
but more dramatic was the change in the composition of ALMP. Participation in train-
ing remained a constant 66%, but employment subsidy schemes lost significant ground to
direct employment. Following the birth of Community Employment in 1994, the num-
bers engaged in direct employment schemes continued to grow until a peak of 56,090 in
1997. Employment subsidy schemes, on the other hand, peaked at 41,859 (or 44% of total
participation) in 1999, remaining only slightly below this level thereafter.
Overall provision, which peaked at 111,055 in 1997, has fallen in response to a general
tightening of the labour market. In a visible reorientation of public policy regarding ALMP
in 1998, participation in training was halved and direct employment fell by some 6,500
places. This trend in the composition of ALMP was largely been maintained up to 2002,
with direct employment schemes such as Community Employment shrinking to pre-1994
levels. By 2002, training accounted for just one-fifth of all ALMP participation. The die
was clearly cast in favour of subsidised employment schemes with a supporting role for
training and an ever-decreasing allocation of places to direct-employment schemes.
8.1 Expenditure Commitment & Intensity
When measured as a portion of GDP, Ireland’s commitment to ALMP has always been
generous. In the period where data is available from the OECD’s Social Expenditure
Database (1985-2001), Ireland typically spent 1.4% of GDP on labour market programmes
– consistently above our European neighbours. The ratio of ALMP expenditure to GDP
in these countries has been a remarkably constant 0.9%. The turnaround in Ireland’s
economic fortunes from the mid-1990s explains the dramatic decline in the ratio of ALMP
to GDP, as the latter began to soar with the contribution of multi-national firms.
Even more remarkable has been the ratio of ALMP to Public Social Expenditure
(health, education etc), which has consistently been twice the European average. This
ratio peaked at 8% of total public social expenditure in 1995 (reflecting the expansion
of places in subsidised employment schemes such as Community Employment) but fell
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sharply thereafter. Again, this reflects the reorientation of labour market policy and the
steady reduction in subsidised employment places.
The intensity of ALMP expenditure relative to European norms is highlighted by
Figure 2c. Here we show gross government expenditure on ALMP per person unemployed4.
We then express expenditure per head as a ratio of the Average Production Wage, which
approximates the earnings of a single male production worker5. During the dark days
of double-digit unemployment (mid-1980s to mid-1990s), government spending on ALMP
per capita unemployed was just half of the European average. Expenditure intensity did
not meet (or exceed) the EU15 average until the reversal of fortune in the Irish labour
market and the ensuing fall in unemployment post 1998. The purpose of this illustration
is to demonstrate that while Ireland is often cited has having devoted significant resources
to ALMP (relative to both GDP and public social expenditure), in reality the intensity
of this expenditure when expressed per capita unemployed, and relative to the average
production wage, falls far short of the European average for the same period.
9 Evaluating Labour Market Programmes: What and How?
In the context of labour market programmes evaluation means to adjudicate on the effec-
tiveness of a scheme in achieving specified measurable goals. These specified goals are the
putative effects or desired outcomes which are expected to arise from participation in a
programme – of which the simplest would be an end-state of employment. Other antici-
pated outcomes are related to income, job security and productivity. For evaluation to be
feasible, outcomes must be measurable. Job status and changes in income are among the
simplest to measure as they are easy to observe. Productivity improvements arising from
training are far more difficult to measure and therefore more difficult to evaluate – without
making some simplifying assumptions on the relationship between pay and productivity
by allowing income (an observable) to proxy for productivity (an unobservable)6.
9.1 Macro-level evaluation
The most immediate and desirable effect of increased participation in ALMP is a reduction
in unemployment. However, if some entrants to ALMP are drawn from outside the labour
market (programmes to facilitate school-leavers or homemakers seeking to return to work),
then expansion in ALMP may not translate to a one-for-one reduction in unemployment.
O’Connell and McGinnity (1997, p. 10) identify three principal channels through which
an ALMP may correct malfunctioning of the labour market and affect unemployment:
1. Improving the matching process between job seekers and vacancies;
2. Raising the productivity of the workforce; and
3. Maintaining the effective supply of labour by reducing withdrawals from the labour
force
4A composite series of the total number unemployed, generated from Labour Force Surveys and aug-
mented with local Employment Office Register data where LFS is missing (France: 1985-90, Official
Estimates; Germany: no LFS data pre 1991; Luxembourg: Register Data Only; Netherlands: 1996 LFS
missing; Portugal: 1998 LFS missing; UK: 1985/86 LFS taken from World Development Indicators.)
5Denominated in “national euro”: an OECD term for the retrospective conversion of historical time-
series to euro at the fixed euro-conversion factor.
6Assuming labour was always paid a wage equal to its marginal product, or contribution to output.
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Firstly, training and employment programmes, as well as public employment services,
may increase the efficiency of the matching process – thereby lowering the number of
job seekers. Training will adjust the skills of job seekers; while the provision of temporary
employment provides work experience for job seekers and reassures employers of their skills
and capabilities. Secondly, training programmes are expected to contribute to national
economic competitiveness and to increase overall employment through enhancing the skills
and competencies of the labour force as a whole.
Thirdly, all forms of ALMP are expected to maintain labour force participation, in-
creasing competition for jobs and ameliorating pressures on wage inflation. Specifically,
O’Connell and McGinnity (1997, p. 11) contend that, “ALMPs targeted specifically at
those disadvantaged in the labour market can have the effect of redistributing job oppor-
tunities to [labour market] outsiders.”
Other studies have supported O’Connell & McGinnity’s optimism. Specifically, Jack-
man, Pissarides and Savouri (1990) have shown that ALMP expenditure substantially
reduced unemployment in fourteen OECD members during the 1980s. In addition, an
OECD study (1993) found a negative correlation between ALMP expenditure and employ-
ment growth – which its authors explain as a counter-cyclical increase in labour market
expenditure during recession.
Bellman (1996), in a study of seventeen OECD countries over the period 1975-1993,
failed to find any relationship between various measures of ALMP expenditure (public
employment services, training, subsidies for private sector employment, direct job cre-
ation measures) and employment growth. However, he found the ratio of expenditure
between active and passive measures to have a significant and negative relationship with
the unemployment rate.
Calmfors (1994, p. 38) cautions against considering the macroeconomic impact of
ALMPs in isolation. Rather, ALMPs should be considered “one ingredient of many”
in a general programme against unemployment.
O’Connell and McGinnity (1997) also identify some negative effects of ALMPs. Pri-
marily, policy programmes may raise participant’s wage expectations; and public invest-
ments/expenditure may suffer from deadweight and displacement effects7. In fact, in
a study analysing the impact of wage subsidy schemes in 400 firms, Breen and Halpin
(1989) found 68% of hirings were deadweight, while 21% represented a substitution effect
to avail of the subsidy. Displacement of existing workers was also a feature of wage subsidy
schemes, with 8% of new subsidised hirings removing an existing employee.
9.2 Micro-level evaluation
A simple and effective method of evaluation is a follow-up interview. In Ireland, FA´S
have published nine waves of follow-up interviews for graduates of their programmes since
1994. This straightforward mechanism records the transition of ALMP graduates into
work, unemployment, education/training or home duties approximately eighteen months
following the completion of an ALMP. A number of obvious trends emerge from the follow
up data, which is summarised in Table 5. Firstly, the post-treatment employment sta-
tus of ALMP graduates is closely tied to economic performance overall. For example, in
1994 just three-fifths of training scheme graduates and less than one-fifth of Community
Employment (CE) graduates were moving into employment. There was a marked im-
provement in employment chances from 1996 onwards, and by 2000 when unemployment
7Deadweight arises where a policy objective would have been achieved even in the absence of interven-
tion. Displacement occurs where subsidised labour (or programme participants) undercut/circumvent the
prevailing market wage and replace existing workers.
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Table 5: Percentage of FA´S Follow-Up Survey Respondants in Employment, by Pro-
gramme Type, 1994-2004
Programme 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Skills-Specific Training 60 75 72 75 64 54 54 59
Community Employment 18 36 31 44 38 30 37 29
Source: FA´S (2005).
itself fell to almost 4%, some 75% of training scheme graduates and 44% of CE graduates
were moving into jobs. Other changes reflect differences in the clientele of both training
and employment schemes. Whereas an increasing number of (presumably younger) FA´S
trainees are moving into further training or education (from 12% to 20% in the ten years
from 1994), the number of coming off CE and entering home duties has more than doubled
over the same period. If the focus of evaluation was on the relative outcomes of training
and employment schemes alone, then it would surely conclude that both schemes have
enjoyed increased effectiveness at moving people into jobs. While this is true, it neglects
the very serious selection effects which act to push people with certain characteristics into
either scheme.
Robust economic evaluation requires a wider starting point. To know the survival
rate (or duration to re-employment) of those exiting employment schemes is of less value
on its own than also knowing the corresponding duration to re-employment of those who
remained passively unemployed in the same period. So much more so if we may match
people exiting schemes with a passively unemployed pair (even multiple pairs), all on
the basis of pre-treatment identifying information – their pre-treatment similarities. This
method evaluates a scheme’s efficacy relative to what would have occurred in the absence
of participation/treatment. This “what would have happened” is termed a counterfactual
and forms the the Achilles Heel of evaluation studies. Since we will never observe what
would have happened had the person not participated in ALMP, our counterfactual must
always be imputed. One recent and attractive remedy has been the emergence of pseudo-
experimental techniques which aim to identify ex post an appropriate control group from
non experimental data (for example, a longitudinal household survey).
Halpin and Hill (2007) undertook an evaluation of the income and employment effects
of active labour market policy in Ireland for the Combat Poverty Agency. They used data
from the Irish component of the European Community Household Survey Panel which
provides income, employment, education, health and welfare information on each person
in some 14,000 households across eight waves (1994-2001 inclusive). It also includes a self-
report calendar for the twelve months preceding each wave. A household has a maximum
of 108 longitudinal observations8 – though the median number of observations are fewer
due to attrition over time.
Halpin and Hill’s methodology may be intuitively explained as focusing on three dis-
tinct time periods. In the “before” period (termed t−1), it is not yet known who from the
available population will enter unemployment or accept participation in an ALMP. By the
second time period (t) the events of interest have occured and the sample of unemployed
may be split between those who remain passively unemployed and those enter training or
employment schemes. Before moving onto the third stage and comparing the outcomes
of both groups, adequate account of observed differences between the two groups must be
8Eight years by twelve months, plus an additional twelve months preceding the first wave.
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taken with the help of variables drawn from the same dataset. Examples of useful covari-
ates are: sex, age, education, geographic location, previous unemployment experiences,
number of dependents, etc.
In the simplest case, members of the treatment and control groups are matched on
all of their shared covariates. The practicality of this approach declines quickly as more
covariates are added and ultimately it becomes unmanageable match on all the desired
information – prompting applied researchers to refer to it as the curse of dimensionality.
To address this Halpin and Hill rely on the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
who demonstrated that matching on each and every covariate is not necessary. Rather it
is sufficient to match on a propensity score (that treatment and controls would be equally
as likely to participate based on what we knew about them at t − 1). To estimate the
scores a logistic model is fitted using as many covariates as may be justified9.
Using each person’s estimated propensity score (how likely they were to participate
given their background), they pair off each person from the treatment group with a
matched control. Instead of matching on all t− 1 covariates, now we match on propensity
score alone. To avoid inappropriate or spurious matches, many algorithms attempt to
achieve balance across the available covariates. Realistically it may also not be possible
to match each and every treatment observation. Consider a treatment observation with
a propensity score of one (i.e., a certain probability to participate). Since none of the
potential matches available in the control group opted to join an ALMP, there can be no
control with a propensity score of 1. Instead, matching is restricted to an area of common
support10.
In this state of conditional independence, any difference in their post-programme out-
comes (income, employment etc) may be attributed to a casual effect arising from partic-
ipation in the labour programme11.
Halpin and Hill found participation in training schemes to have no discernible effect on
subsequent household poverty status (relative to a matched pair who remained passively
unemployed), while participation in employment schemes had a potentially negative effect
– though neither effect was statistically significant. In terms of employment outcomes,
training scheme participants have an employment rate that is not significantly different
from their matched control; whereas employment schemes appear to carry a significant
employment penalty. Only 25 percent of employment scheme participants were found to be
in employment in the subsequent year, compared to 45 percent of their matched controls.
In an earlier study, Breen (1991) analysed the effectiveness of training and employment
schemes using a five-year follow-up survey of 1981/2 school-leavers. Comparing the out-
comes of both ALMP participants and non-participants, he found labour market training
schemes increased the short-term employment probabilities of young people, but was un-
able to distinguish any long-term from selection basis which may have motivated peoples’
participation.
Denny et al. (2000) evaluated the employment and earnings outcomes of ALMP par-
ticipants against a group of non-participants over the period 1994-96. Their methodology
involved a comparison of ALMP participants from the time they left their programmes
with a control group who remained in open-unemployment and chose not to participate
in ALMP. Only persons who were unemployed during the first wave of the LIS, and at
risk of participating in ALMP, were admitted to the final control group of 558. This first
9See Imbens (2008) for a stepwise algorithm.
10Visualise the area of overlap between two cumulative distribution functions; for example, two overlap-
ping bell curves drawn side by side.
11An intuitive overview of the nonparametric difference-in-difference approach to evaluation is given by
O’Neill (2000).
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step in establishing a control group is based on employment status alone and does not
take account of other factors that may influence selection into labour market programmes.
Specifically, the control group in this study were (on average) older, more likely to hold
no qualification and more likely to have been unemployed for two years or more.
When outcomes in 1996 are compared, ALMP participants where twice as likely as the
control group to have obtained employment. The same is true of employment type, where
ALMP graduates are more than twice as likely to have secured fulltime employment. Their
report cautions of significant deviation in employment outcomes between the varieties of
ALMP: recipients of specific training were the most likely to secure employment (75%),
followed closely by those whose employment was subsidised (70%). The progression to
employment from general training was less significant (47%); while only 36% of those
engaged in direct employment schemes progressed to mainstream employment.
To obtain a more robust estimate of the differences accruing to both groups it is nec-
essary to control for observable differences between them. Obvious candidates are age,
sex, education and employment history. Denny et al. fit a logistic model of employment
probabilities using the LIS control group as a reference category. They report the em-
ployment probabilities for participants in three flavours of ALMP (employment subsidy,
specific training, general training) are significant and positive when compared to the ref-
erence category (the passively unemployed comparison group). Only those who completed
direct employment schemes show no significant increase in employment probabilities com-
pared to the reference category. The effects of having a secondary or tertiary education
are positive and significant; while conversely, the effect of being out of work for more than
one and two years are negative and significant.
Applying the same methodology to estimate the earnings effect of participation, Denny
et al. repeat their finding of a significant positive effect of specific skills training (SST)
on earnings – though the effect on wages is weaker than that reported for the probability
of re-employment. Furthermore, by interacting SST with sex, age and unemployment
duration, they find that SST is most effective at raising the earnings of women and those
over twenty-five (though neither is strongly significant). The authors find the principal
impact of ALMP is to raise the probability of employment (particularly for ALMP with
strong labour market linkages, such as specific skills training), rather than to enhance the
earnings of participants. These findings were later confirmed in the published analysis of
O’Connell (2002) who concluded, “specific skills training are shown to have substantially
greater employment chances than the comparison group, and indeed, than participants in
the less market-orientated general training programme.”
Very obvious and interesting questions arise where an evaluation of the income and
employment effects of a labour market policy fails to identify significant positive improve-
ments in either, despite the unprecedented employment and real wage growth witnessed
under the Celtic Tiger? Intuitively, some of those treated under labour market programmes
must have gained employment. Equally, some of those who were voluntarily unemployed
due to a high replacement rate or reservation wage, must have been encouraged back to
work by rising real wages. If both of these statements appear true, then why are they not
supported by the findings of evaluations?
At least part of the answer is attributable to variations in the methodologies used to
“evaluate” ALMP, including differences in the defining a counterfactual or control group
and further differences in the time elapsed before follow-up observation. In all but a true
experiment, these constraints are imposed on researchers by the structure of the data
which has almost always been collected with a different purpose in mind.
Deloitte and Touche (1998) undertook an evaluation of CE for the Dept. of Enterprise,
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Trade and Employment in 1998. In their study, they made use of FA´S follow-up surveys
from the years 1996 and 1997. The surveys, which took place approximately eighteen
months after completion of a FA´S programme, contain a range of conditioning variables
including sex, age, education and income. The study estimates the conditional likelihood
of employment eighteen months post treatment. Similarly, the authors draw a separate
sample of those who were usually unemployed in the same year as the CE treatment
group begun their labour market programme. Using a set of similar conditioning variables
they estimate the conditional likelihood of the control group being in employment at the
same time as the follow-up survey was conducted. By comparing these, they identify an
average marginal employment effect of CE at 7.4% (11% in 1996; 3.8% in 1997). This is
a dramatic contrast to the estimates of Halpin and Hill, who found employment schemes
participants where 22% less likely to be employed at follow-up interview12. There are
some important differences between both studies. Whereas Deloitte and Touche attempt
to compare follow-up surveys with LFS data, Halpin and Hill draw their observations from
the same dataset collecting using the same survey instrument. In addition, where Deloitte
and Touche compares the conditional likelihood of employment overall (for the aggregate
follow-up and control groups), Halpin and Hill attempt to match both groups based on
pre-treatment conditioning variables. The benefit of this match means that differences in
employment outcomes are benchmarked to a matched pair with with (almost) identical
covariates.
10 ALMP and the Contemporary Labour Market
Since 1995 we have witnessed a dramatic decline in unemployment– absolute numbers were
more than halved while the unemployment rate itself fell from 9 to 4 per cent. The swift
decline was echoed in the number long-term unemployed which fell to 34,000 or 45 per
cent of all unemployed by 2000. These trends are illustrated in Figure 1, along with the
corresponding increase in the labour force. Economic growth in the ten years since 1995
has averaged almost 8 per cent per annum13, fuelling a virtuous cycle of investment and
job creation. While growth itself is undoubtedly responsible for returning vast swathes of
the unemployed back to the labour force, the sustained fall in long-term unemployment
is equally dramatic but, as argued by O’Connell (1998), distinct from the fall in regular
unemployment. The first softening of LTU in 1994/5 coincided with the addition of 20,000
additional places on Community Employment schemes14, while further reductions in LTU
witnessed in 1996/7 also coincided with the introduction of measures allowing long-term
unemployed to retain a portion of their benefits upon returning to work. As noted by
O’Connell (1998, p. 39), “to the extent that the Back to Work Allowance Scheme resulted
in a decline in long-term unemployment, this must be counted as a success of active labour
market policy.”
Whereas much of the academic discourse on the retrenchment of public social pro-
vision has centred on the rolling back of the Keynesian Welfare State, the Irish welfare
tradition was rarely characterised as anything else but liberal – along with the UK, US
and Australia (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). Nevertheless, the capacity of our “liberal”
model of public social provision has also been tested – particularly in regard to historic
levels of unemployment and the scale of participation in labour market programmes.
The extent of state retrenchment (including welfare state) in Ireland in the recent past
12With a standard error of 3.8, or upper and lower bounds of 29 and 14 at the 95% confidence interval.
137.6%, measured as the change in real GDP. Source: OECD.
14Thereby accounting for 20,000 of the 25,000 observed reduction in LTU
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is debatable. Kirby and Murphy (2007, p. 9) point to low levels of personal and corporate
taxation limiting the state’s capacity to fund social security; to increased female labour
force participation forcing families into market-based solutions for child and elder-care;
and a drift to targeted means-tested “ungenerous” social protection. They highlight moves
to an “active, productivist” welfare state which simultaneously encourages and compels
labour market participation. Notwithstanding this, many social welfare benefits have
received large nominal increases and a welcome (though as yet arbitrary) trend towards
indexation with consumer price inflation has emerged. This is not to say the level of many
social welfare benefits is anything but subsistence or below.
Leaving retrenchment aside, a reorientation of the Irish welfare state towards supply-
side intervention and feeding competitiveness though labour market flexibility has oc-
curred. Jessop (1994) refers to this subordination of social policy as the Schumpeterian
“workfare state”. In fact, the scaling back of direct employment schemes, the redistribu-
tion of resources in favour of retraining, and the mandatory referral of newly registered
unemployed to a public employment service (FA´S), have merely brought Irish practice
into line with established EU/OECD norms.
This view of Irish welfare reform has been echoed by Taylor (2005, p. 94) who concludes
its “principle motivation” has rested firmly upon enhancing the flexibility of the labour
market and not upon extending social rights. Boyle points to FA´S as a ready-established
(and therefore cheap and attractive) method of addressing labour market problems –
bypassing other government departments and agencies. Boyle (2005, p. 113-4) continues,
“this reflects the pragmatic-populist streak in Irish politics [...] favouring cheap flexible
solutions [over] long-term commitments.’
Much of the academic debate over changes in the Irish welfare state is little more than
ex-post commentary. If the die has been cast (globally) in favour of open markets and
free movement for international capital, then protecting competitiveness is one of the few
remaining areas of economic sovereignty for national governments. While we may justifi-
ably expect a positive correlation between national income and public social provision, the
arrival of truly global markets has put paid to aspirations for social democracy in Ireland.
Its long wake in academic literature contributes little to debate how public policy might
best respond to the realities of economic openness, globalised markets and the challenges
of maintaining industrial competitiveness without even a monetary policy to call our own.
Further analysis in this area would address the nenewed importance of state-sponsored
training schemes in the light of structural change in the economy (post-construction boom)
and the role of life-long learning in maintaining and improving peoples’ skill-sets. Recent
government policy including the National Skills Strategy and FA´S’ own programme, One
Step Up, have firmly reorientated policy towards subsidised training and opened a new
chapter in employment policy in Ireland.
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Figure 2: (a) ALMP Expenditure Relative to GDP; (b) ALMP Relative to Total Public
Social Expenditure; (c) ALMP Expenditure per Registered Unemployed as a Percentage
of Average Production Wage. Source: OECD (1994), OECD (various), ILO (Laborsta).
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